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Figure 1: Julie W. takes a call in her office
I am sitting in the office of lead systems engineer,
Julie W.,[1] who is responsible for overseeing the
engineering team that operates the spacecraft and
ensures its health and safety as it orbits Saturn
collecting scientific data. Julie has dedicated much
of her career over the past twenty years to the
Saturn Mission at the Planetary Explorations
Laboratory (referred to colloquially as “the Lab”),
working first as the Testing Conductor when the
spacecraft was in ATLO (Assembly, Test, and
Launch Operations) before transitioning to the lead
engineer for the Spacecraft Office to manage
operations. We have just come from a dramatic
meeting convened to discuss mysterious electrical
charges that have been building up on the craft
after the repeated shorting out of one of its
scientific instruments. The critical dispute at the
meeting centered on whether these shortages
comprise a risk beyond the local instrument’s
functionality – potentially impacting the craft as a
whole, along with its eleven other scientific
instruments – thus requiring caution before turning
the instrument back on. At stake if the shortages
indeed pose such a risk, is the ability of the
spacecraft to fly another five years, the current
projection of how much flight time they have left
on remaining fuel, and upon which much scientific
observation depends. At the same time, a final
decision to not turn the instrument back on means
the closing up shop of an instrument’s engineering
facility and the end of data collection for many
disciplinary scientists who use it.
At the meeting, Julie deftly shifted the debate
away from the instrument team’s perspective, to a
contest between two competing theories of the
craft as a whole: one presented by an engineer
who had worked with Julie back in the ‘90s on the
design and assembly of the spacecraft, flown in
specifically for this meeting; the other by an
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engineer on her current team who has been
maintaining the craft for years. On the one hand,
she has the theory of a developer who has intimate
hands-on knowledge of the spacecraft when it was
“still on the ground” – knowledge of its inner
workings, manufacturing specifications, and
designs; on the other, an operator who has worked
with the ongoing behavior of this now remote
object day in and out over the decade and a half it
has been in flight around Saturn.
This conflict between two theories of the craft,
touches upon a divide between two career
identities and domains of knowledge at the Lab –
between the work of designing, developing, and
launching missions and that of operating and
maintaining them. This divide, which I will gloss
interchangably
as design vs. maintenance or 
development vs. operations, is often explained by
engineers at the Lab in terms of the different skills
or personalities that are required in different
phases of the lifecycle of a mission. It is indicative
of the sharp distinctions between professionalized
career identities at the Lab that in addition to
Developers and Operators also includes
Navigators, Science Planners, and Project
Managers. At the Lab, these identities cut across
mission organizations and have their own lab-wide
meetings and personnel management. This
“cultural divide”
between operator and developer occupational
identities is also well established in the engineering
management literature which has, for example,
shown how it can lead to misconceptions about the
nature of work,[2] prevent organizational
learning,[3] or obscure invisible forms of work that
cross this boundary.[4] This distinction is also
pervasive in the software engineering industry and
has spurred its own new professional identity of
“DevOps” – people who can bridge the gap
between Dev and Ops.[5]
Figure 2: Devnet Opsnet: For software developers
at the Lab there are distinct ethernet jacks for
connecting to the development versions of
software systems and those in operations
As Schein outlines, while developer culture orients
to an industry-wide occupational community and
emphasizes planning for safety, perfectly running
machines, and designing humans (or room for
human error) out of the system; operator culture is
defined locally in relation to the continuously
changing environment and ongoing learning or
“expected surprises” that arise due to the
interdependencies of any complex engineering
system[6]. Foundational studies of organizational
practice in science and technology studies have
also explored this divide in terms of “relations of
technology production and use” drawing attention
to the contingent nature of operations work that
disrupts idealizations of design as a singular
authorial practice.[7] As Suchman puts it, “products
of professional design will always be based in
partial, specifically situated and historically
constituted projections” of an artifact’s life,
whereas ongoing operational work inevitably
surfaces discoveries due to the contingencies of a
shifting operational environment.[8]
A truism at the Lab conveys this division aptly,
declaring that a spacecraft is never flown by the
people who designed it. This is said to hold true at
the Mission, which experienced a major turnover of
management and personnel when it began to
conduct its first scientific observation as it passed
by Jupiter on its way to Saturn in 2001. From Julie I
heard that this truism reflects the sense that
operations work involves uses and conditions that
were never “intended” in the original design,
something which significantly perturbs developers
who cannot bear to see the purity of their designs
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altered.
Figure 3: Bunnysuited engineers pose for a photo
in the cleanroom during ATLO – Assembly Test and
Launch Operations
Operations work, in this view, demands letting go
of designs to make room for the emergent life of
an object in space which could never have been
fully known in advance. It is precisely this
unknowability that had Julie’s lead operator for the
spacecraft bus (the main body of the craft, akin to a
computer’s motherboard) jumping up and down
with excitement at the meeting as he proposed his
theory of why the shortages were occurring. From
his point of view, no matter what facts the
developer could draw forth from manufacturing
specifications of the spacecraft hardware, these
could only ever be based on simulations and
estimates. In contrast, the team was now
witnessing a frontier of engineering knowledge –
having never seen what happens when these
resistors and capacitors endure the vacuum of
space for so many years. The very duration of this
machine’s lifetime, its aging and decay, propel it to
the cutting-edge and if he can convince his team
and superiors of his theory he might just get a
publication out of it.
Figure 4: Lead engineer explains why the shortages
are occurring
This shorting out of an instrument was one of
several disruptions that emerged during my time at
the Mission that engineers began to refer to as
“lifetime issues.” While there are many sources of
disruption to routine work on a mission, lifetime
issues are those that are attributed to the aging of
the craft, precipitated not by any particular
occurrence so much as by the very longevity of the
craft. Other examples of “lifetime issues” included
when one of the reaction wheels (wheels used to
articulate the position of the spacecraft) started to
show signs of “drag” – a jump in the amount of
torque needed to command the wheel at a
particular speed. Ultimately the cause of drag was
attributed to the seizing up of lubricant in the
reaction wheel casing, something which was not
predicted by its manufacturing specifications which
guarantee its cycles per lifetime based only on
upper bounds of spin rates. What was never
simulated, nor feasible to simulate in manufacturing
tests, was what happens when this wheel dwells at
very low speeds, just shy of zero, for extended
periods of time, as happens when stabilizing the
spacecraft in its orbit on a regular basis. Every time
I think of this, I imagine two hypothetically identical
wheels, separated at birth, one living out a slow
death in space, the other expending its short life at
a manufacturer’s testing facility, spinning at its
maximum speed until it expires.
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Wikipedia: Reaction Wheel
 The wheel’s seizing up or the instrument’s shorting
out are both moments of rupture in the work of the
spacecraft team, moments which can also be quite
final about the fate of an instrument, or a wheel, as
well as the forms of work that attend them. Yet
they are also the outcome of a slow drag over time,
as the externalities of the assumptions embedded
within these design specs build up slowly over time
until they become evident. Lifetime issues, rather
than residing strictly in the time of maintenance,
draw together multiple moments from across the
life of an artifact. The partial death of the craft, the
loss of one of its instruments, is a moment “out of
order” [9] not only because it is a moment in which
things have broken down, but because of the way
that two forms of knowledge about the craft that
are ordinarily kept distinct are put to test against
one another.
Figure 5: Julie explains the assembly of the craft
In her office, Julie tries to explain to me the details
of the competing theories, walking me through a
circuit diagram used at the meeting to discuss
where the shortages are theoretically occurring.
She then pulls down one of her commemorative 3D
models of the craft to show me how the instrument
is positioned in relation to its sensors or “pick-ups”.
Dissatisfied with both of these, she pulls out an
enormous binder of hi-resolution photographs
cataloging the spacecraft hardware when it was still
being assembled. As she leafs through picture after
picture, she traces the wires with her fingers,
showing me where her engineers fused the wiring
together that “gives the spacecraft [hardware] its
great performance to this day” and where the wires
connect to the spacecraft sensors, its “eyes and
ears” that deliver the telemetry data that is all her
team now has on hand to figure out what is going
wrong with the craft.
There is something about seeing these images of
the spacecraft in ATLO, its internal wirings
exposed, after so many months at the Mission
seeing only models, diagrams, data visualizations,
and software simulations, that gives me a sudden
visceral experience of the distance in both time and
space between the craft depicted in these photos
and the one now orbiting Saturn, fully out of reach.
Here Julie is, in the midst of a debate about an
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object which cannot be touched or observed
directly, tracing the wires in the photos almost as if
to bring the tactile memory back to her from years
ago. Despite the mundane day to day operations
of keeping a craft in flight and delivering science, it
is also a reminder of the awesome feat of
maintaining such fine-tuned control over a machine
that is over a billion kilometers away. It also drives
home the feeling that the craft can be in two places
at once. It can be here in the Lab through models,
diagrams, software programs, simulations, design
documents, code libraries and high-res
photographs as well as flying in outer space. The
craft is multiple[10] and its trajectory from design to
launch to operations to death is not a simple linear
temporal arc. These multiple bodies of the craft
that may originate in different times, in fact co-exist
and continue to re-articulate each other in practice.
Figure 6: A timeline mural of the Mission traces
from the earliest forms of astronomical technique
up to the launch of the Mission. This linear narrative
illustrates the "done at launch" attitude that many
operators complain discounts the work that
happens after launch.
The decision over whether to turn a shorting
instrument back on, draws out development and
operations as competing theories of the craft, as
differently embodied ways of knowing its
materiality, that are epistemologically
incompatible: one based in the authority of having
been there during the spectacular time of launch,
the power of being together with the craft when
the Mission originated; the other based on the
authority of having lived with the craft over time,
through the period when the spacecraft has
become known in its particularities. The contrast
then is not only between competing ideas but
between two different modes of knowledge, both
of which Julie’s career spans.
Figure 7: Still from Clip Julie explaining the wiring
of the spacecraft bus
Julie, tracing the photographed wires with her
fingers, seems almost to be trying to recall the craft
and its materiality, to bring that time back to her.
She begins reminiscing not only to the time when
these photos were taken, when the spacecraft was
in ATLO, but also tracing out the entire coincident
timeline of her own career path and the life of this
object. Julie explains that it was her intimate
knowledge of the craft, knowledge that was gained
when the craft was physically present, that
recommended Julie to her superiors as the right
person to take over operations of the craft.
As she explains to me, that is why they brought her
on as the head of the spacecraft office as they
entered into operations. “They needed someone
who had been there, touched the spacecraft.”
“My claim to fame is that when I tell [the project
manager] about the solid state power switches, I
know how they look, I know where [they are], their
combination, I know how they’re plugged in, how
they’re wired. I’ve traced the wires out to wherever
the parts went. And I think that is a fairly unique
background for operations. Not very many people
want to follow [a spacecraft] into operations. It
takes a special kind of person. At [the Lab]
operations is not particularly valued as a career
choice. You know, they want designers, they want
the paper writers. And so it is funny… we always
laugh because it is operations—running a
spacecraft in flight – is what gets you in the
newspapers. If we were successful in doing our job
then this is great, these great pictures come down
and they hit the spacecraft and they hit the
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newspapers and [the Mission] is wonderful. If it is a
disaster in operations you get: “spacecraft saved
again” or “lost spacecraft.” So you’re still in the
newspaper. And so while I don’t claim to
understand why operations is not a valued position,
I do just kind of say, well we’re the ones that get
you publicity, good or bad.”
Julie goes on to compare her own “meandering
career path” with those of her male colleagues with
whom she worked in the past, men whom she
describes as the “cream of the crop” and “top of
their class at CalTech” who went “straight to the
top” at the Lab. These are men, still touted as the
“pioneers” of the Mission, whom I had seen
arriving to podiums to receive accolades or to
speak about the accomplishments of the Mission at
lab-wide events, venues where stories of the
frontiers of space science are told and re-told,
events well-attended by Mission engineers who still
claim these men as their own. In deciding to stay
on as lead engineer of Spacecraft Operations, she
expresses feeling at the time like she was
“dropping out of the game,” watching as her
colleagues moved on to mission after mission. Yet
she also speaks with gratitude for the longevity of
the spacecraft, grateful to the engineers who fused
its wires together so well, that give the machinery
its great performance to this day, and which has
granted her a long and fulfilling career. “I used to
think I might have had another mission in me. But I
think I’ll ride this one out… It’s been a good ride.”
Figure 8: The stickiness of career identities: a joke
placard given to Julie by her engineers with a
mantra to help her remember she is no longer the
ATLO Test Conductor after she continued to sign
off with her old handle.
In this articulation, development and operations are
not only two forms of knowledge or career paths,
but also different temporalities. Development work
enables engineers to always be at the forefront of
space science engineering, working on the newest
missions about to launch, working with the latest
technologies and methodologies; whereas
operations work inherently entails devaluation as
the forms of work and technology that might have
been current at launch slowly obsolesce.
Development work runs in faster time cycles, the
quickened pace of “the game” – whereas
operations work represents the long dureé, the
“ride” or “slow burn.” Development and
operations are in this sense chronotopic in that
they bring together strong identities with spatial
and temporal ordering of organizational practice
and narratives.[11]  In the spectacular time of
assembly and launch and the drawn out time of
maintenance what is ordered is not only work and
the movement of people onto and off of projects,
but also affective temporal relations to work as
expressed in the “game” or the “ride”.
Development work brings with it the power of
being together when the craft is built, the
deadlines and the spectacle of the launch.
Operations work involves coming together with
colleagues over many years, an “epic journey” in
which lives are marked out together by the
alignments of major personal life events to mission
milestones, punctuated by retirements and deaths
of both robots[12] and colleagues, as well as by the
launches of other missions.
Link to video
Routine meetings at the Mission are interrupted for
lab-wide events to celebrate mission launches.
Engineers also make an effort to attend mission
launches, a once in a lifetime experience.  Photos
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from one such event were shared by one engineer
after she returned from her vacation spent
attending the final launch of the Endeavor space
shuttle from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
Yet while we can see these two forms of work as
temporally and culturally distinct, they are also
brought together. For one, they come together in
the sense that they are always understood in
relation to one another. Julie’s comparison
between the game and the ride reveals the ways
these two identities are worked together in
relation. Julie, tracing the wires with her fingers is
not only trying to recall the craft and its materiality,
but is also tracing out a comparison between these
two forms of life as they coincide within her own
career. She is tracing out the shared history of her
own career and the life of the spacecraft object.
Her uncommon choice to stay with the Mission,
provides a source of continuity to the team and
forges a link between development and operations.
Within the time of the spacecraft’s lifetime, then, as
in the duration of her career, these heterogeneous
knowledges are bound together, and she as she
faces a decision about the end-of-life of one part of
the spacecraft, she struggles to make a cut
between them.
****
 
Ensmenger suggests that within software
engineering the two kinds of work that are
considered development and operations share
more than they differ. He suggests that instead of
there being anything essentially different between
the two, we ought to consider what the
demarcation accomplishes in practice.[13]  It is true
that the boundary between these two forms of
work breaks down at the Lab at times, such as
when “development talent” needs to be retained
in operations work roles during times when no
missions are in development. The changeover of
personnel from development to operations on the
Mission is also gendered in that this changeover
comprised a male attrition from top roles which
have mostly been taken over by women. This leads
to a feminization of operations work which likely
contributes to its marginalization. In this sense
operations acts as a form of reproductive labor[14] in
that it continues to accrue success to the Mission’s
designers even as it is seen as merely maintaining
the status quo.
Design is a time of origins, of seminal moments, of
creativity, while maintenance is the time of stasis, a
form of reproductive labor that is not meant to
generate novelty (which is why when it predictably
does produce novelty this is treated as a crisis or
source of pathos rather than par for the course.)
Design often succeeds in achieving its quickened
temporality through deferral of the problems that
are too messy to deal with under the pressure of
launch. This often leads to the pathologizing of
operations as the vector if not the origin of mess. (I
heard many times that the Mission “attracts”
personalities, or that people need a strong
personality in order to work there, or that particular
people attract bugs to surface in the 40-year old
code running there.)  So while I concur with
Ensmenger that we should ask what the
demarcation accomplishes in practice, this
demarcation is not something that is done once
and for all at the moment of “hand-off” but is done
again and again. In drawing attention to lifetime
issues I wish to consider not only what the
purification of these two kinds of work
accomplishes but also what adheres in their relation
to each other over the lifetime of a technological
object.
Lifetime issues are a particular strain of mess which
arises not only from the deferrals of design but
from the deferrals that are inherent in any decision,
they form a kind of wake of decisions that have
been lived with for a long time. At the Mission
there was always a critical distinction drawn
between forms of discovery and of forgetting.
When an anomalous event occurs, such as
unexpected data being returned from the craft, or
when a fault is triggered, the appropriate response
is framed in terms of whether the event was due to
something which the organization already knew
about the behavior of the craft or its operational
environment but was forgotten, or if this is a form
of “discovery” of something previously unknown
about the craft – something you hope happens
rarely at such a late stage in the lifetime of the
Mission. Yet the attribution of “lifetime issue” to
such an event has a way of dissolving this
distinction since a lifetime issue is in some ways
both a form of discovery and a form of forgetting –
it is a kind of unforgetting of something which
should have been known all along but never was.
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In one such instance during my fieldwork when the
spacecraft went into “safing” – a very rare event in
which the spacecraft cannot read a received file
and points towards earth to await further
instruction) – there were major concerns about
whether an error had been introduced in a software
update sent to the craft. As it turned out, the file
sent was corrupted by a single “bit flip” – a zero
turned to a one due to the bombardment of cosmic
rays. This was, of course, a great relief to Julie and
the project manager since they could simply resend
the original file. But this event was also re-framed
as a lifetime issue, given that the occurrence of
cosmic rays, while rare, are bound to intercept the
radio signal to the craft so often during the long
life of the craft. “Over the years,” Julie offered,
“the spacecraft has in a way become a fine-tuned
instrument for detecting the occurrence of cosmic
rays.”
The usual attempt to distinguish what is forgotten
from what is discovered simultaneously purifies the
source of an anomaly to either the human or the
machine while locating that source in a specific
moment within a linear progressive temporality.
Whereas, lifetime issues seem to reside in the very
notion of the duree, neither then nor now, and
locate the event within a collective body of the
craft, its infrastructure, the organization and the
people within it. Design and maintenance are
coupled together in a relation that is at times
symbiotic and at other times parasitic, but typically
one that is gendered as masculine/feminine. Yet
lifetime issues also reveal relations in excess of that
heteronormative coupling; they constitute a “queer
time” in which the temporal logics and forms of
knowledge that were previously purified from each
other touch, where “continuities… and
contradictions among past, present, and future”
and are shown to be bound together.[15]  
In this sense, lifetime issues present a
disconcertment[16] in the distinction between
development and operations work. Rather than
maintenance being merely design’s after, it is
its other. Operations is development’s alterlife in
that it requires rethinking the scale of
entanglements and inheritances.[17] Drawing on
Freeman, they show how technological media,
rather than only evolving over time, also produce
“nonsequential forms of time… that fold subjects
into structures of belonging and duration.”[18] 
What lifetime issues surface are the ways that both
development and operations are bound up in the
co-histories of people and objects over time.
When lifetime issues arise they reveal the ways that
development and operations work are articulated
and re-articulated in relation to each other
throughout the lifetime of the object. They form a
kind of looking back that gathers up the shared
timings and co-histories of people, organizations,
and artifacts into a collective. Lifetime issues thus
highlight that the relations to design and
maintenance are at once temporal and affective, as
well as how these two are drawn together within
the duration of the object’s lifetime. 
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